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Mobile ad hoc networks involve communications over a shared wireless channel without any centralized infrastructure.
Consequently, in an optimal solution, management and security services depend exclusively on network members. The main
contribution of this paper is an eﬃcient public key management scheme that is suitable for fully self-organized mobile ad hoc
networks where all nodes play identical roles. Our approach implies that the operations of creating, storing, distributing, and
revoking nodes’ public keys are carried out locally by the nodes themselves. The goal of the presented methods is the improvement
in the process of building local certificate repositories of nodes. In order to do it, an authentication solution based on the web
of trust concept is combined with an element of routing based on the multipoint relay concept introduced in the optimized link
state routing protocol. Our proposal leads to a good tradeoﬀ among security, overhead, and flexibility. Experimental results show
a considerable decrease in resource consumption while carrying out the certificate verification process.
1. Introduction
A Mobile Ad hoc NETwork (MANET) is a highly dynamic
wireless network with no fixed infrastructure and heavy
constraints in node capabilities. Such characteristics unable
the use of the classical public key management paradigm
based on a centralized Certification Authority (CA).
Research on the deployment of a Public Key Infrastruc-
ture (PKI) in MANETs has been mainly two tiered so far.
In particular, the two main approaches we can find in the
bibliography are a distributed certification model and a self-
organized scheme.
The methods here described and evaluated are aimed at
improving the process of building the local certificate repos-
itory associated to each node in the self-organized model,
which leads to a significant improvement in the eﬃciency
of the whole model. Particularly, a considerable decrease
in resource consumption while undertaking the verification
process associated to authentication is obtained from the
experiments. In order to achieve such improvement, we face
the problem by combining typical authentication elements
with common ideas used in routing protocols in MANETs.
In particular, the Optimised Link State Routing (OLSR)
protocol from which some ideas regarding the use of the
MultiPoint Relay (MPR) technique have been borrowed to
design the proposed algorithm for updating repositories.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 is
devoted to the description of the background, including the
description of the MPR technique. Since our proposal is
specifically designed to be deployed in the self-organized
public-key management model, Section 3 deals with the
details of the graph-based version of such an approach. A
complete algorithmic description of the proposed method
is provided in Section 4. Section 5 describes the results of
several computational experiments while several conclusions
are included in the last section.
2. Background
In order to improve the construction of certificate reposito-
ries for the key management scheme when adopting the web
of trust model and the self-organized approach to implement
a PKI, we use certain elements of the routing protocol known
2 EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
as OLSR. This section contains an introductory description
of such a protocol, paying special attention to the MPR
technique embedded in it.
Routing in MANETs has been one of the research areas
with more activity [1]. A first basic classification used when
talking about routing protocols distinguishes between proac-
tive and reactive protocols. Protocols in the first category
are characterized by the fact that each node stores a route
for each reachable member of the network, although such a
path may not be required at that precise moment; while in
reactive protocols only when a request for communication
between two nodes is required, a route discovery procedure
is initiated. Due to this feature, reactive protocols are referred
to as on-demand routing protocols. Proactive algorithms
are also known as table-driven routing protocols since local
routing information defining the diﬀerent paths is organized
according to a table stored by each node. The information
contained in such a table defines an entry associated to each
reachable node containing the next node in the path to the
destination, and a metric or distance, among other data. The
metric can be defined in function of several criteria such
as the hop distance, the total delay, or the cost of sending
messages.
In general, when comparing proactive and reactive
protocols, we have that in the first case certain overload is
originated in the network due to the continuous updates
produced in routing information, while in the second case,
certain delay is produced by the execution of routing
discovery procedures any time a new path is defined. In
networks with high mobility, reactive routing protocols have
a better behaviour since the paths are recalculated as soon
as a link state change is detected. Building an accurate
topological map of the network requires exchange of infor-
mation among nodes on a regular basis, which can lead to
certain network overloading on the network, unless network
traﬃc is sporadic. On the other hand, when dealing with
delay-sensitive networks (such as Vehicular Ad hoc NET-
works or VANETs) proactive protocols outperform better
[2].
In this work, we use certain elements of the Optimized
Link State Routing protocol (OLSR) [3], which is one
of the four basic protocols adopted for MANETs. OLSR
is a proactive protocol because local routing information
defining the diﬀerent paths is organized according to a table
stored by each node.
The OLSR routing procedure has been extensively ana-
lyzed in the bibliography, and currently OLSRv2 is under
consideration [4]. Some works devoted to improve it by
integrating security tools [5] have been also developed.
In the OLSR proactive routing two stages can be clearly
diﬀerentiated. Firstly, a reliable map of the network is built.
In order to obtain such an accurate map, all the network
nodes must exchange messages regarding the state of their
connections links. In the second stage, and based on the built
map, the optimum route among the nodes is generated. The
main obstacle this protocol has to skip is the high number of
messages to be exchanged among nodes. However, thanks to
these messages the network configuration is known by all its
members.
In order to reduce the overhead and message redundancy
and to avoid the storm problem [6], a specific technique,
named theMultiPoint Relay technique, was defined in OLSR.
In this technique each node selects a particular neighbour
subset (nodes at one-hop distance with bidirectional links)
whose members will be in charge of broadcasting the
information. By doing so, the number of messages exchanged
is considerably reduced [7].
The MPR technique was originally deployed for reducing
the duplicity of messages at local level when broadcasting
information in a proactive MANET. In general, the number
of redundant packets received by a node may be equal to
the number of neighbours a node has. Roughly speaking, it
can be said that the MPR allows determining the minimum
number of nodes needed for reaching the whole network
when it is recursively applied. This approach obtains better
results regarding optimization in large and dense networks.
The way we use the basics of the MPR in the proposed key
management for MANETs, as well as its relationship with
Graph Theory problems is included below.
2.1. OLSR Description and Notation. In the OLSR protocol
only a subset of nodes will be in charge of retransmitting
the received packets. In this way, every node u must define
among its direct neighbours a set of transmitters (here
denoted by MPR(u)) that will be the only ones in charge
of retransmitting the messages emitted by the initial node.
This means that control packets are retransmitted by a node
belonging toMPR(u) only when the packet was sent by u and
it is the first time it is received. According to this method,
each router chooses independently the set MPR among its
symmetric 1-hop neighbours such that all symmetric 2-hop
neighbours are reachable via at least one symmetric 1-hop
neighbour belonging to MPR(u).
In routing models, the network is usually represented
with a graph whose vertex set V = {u1,u2, . . . ,un} sym-
bolizes the set of nodes of the network. In this way, for any
node u, Ni(u) denotes the set of u’s symmetric neighbours
in an i-hop distance from u. It is assumed that u /∈N1(u).
Consequently,N1(u) stands for u’s direct neighbours and the
cardinality |N1(u)| corresponds to u’s degree. These sets are
defined by using the shortest path and in such a way that
Ni(u) and Ni+1(u) are disjoint sets. Computation of these
shortest paths may be accomplished as stated in [8].
Following the notation defined in [9] jointly with the one
previously introduced in this paper, it is feasible to formally
define the set MPR for a vertex u as MPR(u) ⊆ N1(u)|∀w ∈
N2(u)∃v ∈MPR(u)|w ∈ N1(v).
Through this definition, decision and optimization prob-
lems associated to the MPR construction may be defined.
According to the Computational Complexity hierarchy the
associated decision problem may be reduced in polynomial
time to the Dominating Set problem, which belongs to
the NP-complete class. Therefore a heuristic approach is
adequate for computing the MPR set. The description of
OLSR [3] includes a particular heuristic for solving this
problem (although in [4] it is stated that “Routers can freely
interoperate whether they use the same or diﬀerent MPR
selection algorithms”) as example. The heuristic defined
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there uses a greedy approach handling, among other param-
eters, the willingness of nodes to participate in the routing
process and the vertex degree. A complete description and
analysis of this heuristic may be found in [10]. Next we
include a brief description of such a heuristic.
Step 1. Begin with an empty MPR set.
Step 2. Select those one-hop neighbour nodes of u that are
the only neighbour of some two-hop neighbours of u, and
add them to MPR(u).
Step 3. Add to MPR(u) the neighbour node of u that covers
the largest number of two-hop neighbours of u that are not
yet covered by the current MPR(u) set.
Repeat Step 3 until all two-hop neighbours are covered.
Using the notation introduced so far we may describe the
greedy heuristic distinguishing two main stages as follows.
In the first one those vertices w in N2(u) with a unique
neighbour v in N1(u) are examined in order to include in
MPR(u) the vertex v. If there are remaining nodes without
covering in N2(u), in the second stage, those vertices in
N1(u) covering more vertices in that situation are also
included in MPR(u). A graphic explanation of how the
algorithm works is included in Figure 2.
In order to clarify the proposal we need to define several
vertex subsets that are specified below. First, for each node
v in a one-hop distance from u it is required to consider
a new vertex subset Wu(v) formed by those vertices that
simultaneously belong to the order 2 u’s neighbourhood and
are direct neighbours of v (see Figure 1(a)). This set may be
calculated by the following intersection Wu(v) = N2(u) ∩
N1(v). Vertices in this set have in common the fact that they
are candidates to be covered by vertex v.
A second vertex subset Vw(u) is defined for each vertex w
belonging to u’s two-hop neighbourhood. In this case, such
a subset may be obtained through the intersection Vw(u) =
N1(w) ∩ N1(u) (Figure 1(b)). This new set gathers those
vertices inN1(u) that may cover vertex w. When transferring
this computation to the self-organized PKI model, Vw(u)
is computed by using the set of predecessors of vertex w
denoted by N1(w).
3. PKI Approaches in MANETs
In this section the main characteristics of the public-key
infrastructure models used in MANETs are described before
introducing some new ideas that conform our proposal. We
may find two main alternatives for the deployment of PKIs
in MANETs in the bibliography: distributed certification
authorities, and self-organized public-key management.
In the first case, the certification process is underpinned
by distributed CAs, which use a threshold digital signature
scheme and are in charge of issuing and renewing certificates
of nodes [11–13]. One of the first schemes following this
approach was proposed in [14], where a group of special
nodes, acting as a coalition, are responsible for certification















Figure 1: Defining some vertex subsets.
should be the responsibility of a set of special servers set
included in the network. These servers will sign the public
key of the nodes trough a (t,n) threshold signature scheme
[15]. Therefore, each time a node in the network B wishes
to communicate with one of his peers A, he should contact
with t+1 servers in advance in order to obtain A’s public key
signed with the CA’s secret key. One of the servers included
in the previous coalition will be in charge of playing the
combiner’s role. This means that once he receives the shares
from its peers in the coalition, he generates the signature of
the requested public key. However, there are some general
drawbacks associated to this alternative. First, the combiner










































(b) Stage 2: Nodes of maximum degree are included in MPR(u)
Figure 2: Stages in MPR-OLSR.
figure and the servers acting as certification authorities pro-
duce system overload as all the communications requesting
certification issuance and validation should be attended for
them. Additionally, introducing special servers does not
guarantee the elimination of vulnerabilities to DoS attacks.
Another question to take into account is the need for
additional storage requirements since the public keys of all
the members of the network must be stored by the servers.
When the network is sparse or during its first deployment
stages finding t + 1 servers available in its transmission range
may become a handicap.
The methods included in [16, 17] solve some of the
previous problems by establishing that any node may act
as a member of a distributed CA. Consequently in both
references any group of t + 1 nodes without distinction may
act as servers at the moment of issuing certificates. Hence,
one of the mayor advantages of this strategy is the balance
reached in the distribution of the computational load. Even
though this characteristic is truly important in the scenario
of MANETs, there are still disadvantages associated to this
proposal. For instance, a distributor in charge of providing
credentials to the first nodes should be considered during
the bootstrapping stage. Also finding a valid coalition each
time a certificate needs to be verified may result infeasible
depending on the network actual topology and conditions.
Besides, the methods in [16] do not provide any instrument
to protect against malicious nodes when they send fake
shares.
A general drawback of those methods based on dis-
tributed CA’s is the computational intensive operations
required by the threshold application when signing a cer-
tificate, and the definition of additional procedures such as
share refreshing [18].
Other proposals related to this paradigmmay be found in
the more recent bibliography, but in this work we have opted
by the second type of solutions, based on the self-organized
paradigm, which has been also used for node authentication
[19].
Such a self-organized version of public-key management
was chosen as base for this paper in order to guarantee
identical roles for all MANET nodes. This approach involves
the relocation of the responsibility for creating, storing,
distributing, and revoking public keys among the members
of the network.
3.1. Describing the Self-Organized Approach. The self-
organized model in MANETs was initially described in [20].
Its authors put forward the substitution of the centralized
certification authority by a self-organized scenario where
certification is carried out through chains of certificates
which are issued by the nodes themselves. Such a scheme is
based on the information stored by each node and the trust
relationship among neighbour nodes.
In this work we decided to follow the self-organized key
management model based on the web of trust approach.
Several are the reasons that justify the choice of this option.
First, this model demands less maintenance overhead. Sec-
ondly, it is well worth remarking that on the one hand the
self-organized approach eases the use of a simple bootstrap
mechanism, and on the other hand all the nodes perform
equal roles.
In this model, public keys and certificates are represented
as a directed graph G = (V ,A), known as certificate graph.
Each vertex u in this graph defines a public key of a node,
and each arc (u, v) denotes a certificate associated to v’s
public key, signed with u’s private key. Each node u has a
public key, a private key, and two certificate repositories,
the updated and the nonupdated repositories, denoted,
respectively, Gu and Gu
N . Initially the updated certificate
repository contains the list of certificates on which each
node trusts (out-bound list) and the list of certificates of
all the nodes that trust on u (in-bound list). A sequence
Puv = {(u,u0), (u0,u1), . . . , (um, v)} of certificates where the
vertices are all diﬀerent is called a certificate chain from u to
v.
The tasks that any member of the network has to develop
in this public-key management scheme are:
(1) Certificate Management:
(a) Key generation: the node generates its keys by
itself.
(b) Certificate issuance: each node issues certifi-
cates that bind public keys of other nodes to
their identities.
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(c) Certificate exchange: each node exchanges cer-
tificates with other nodes and builds its non-
updated repository.
(d) Updated certificate repository construction: the
node builds its updated repository.
(2) Public-Key Verification:
(a) Finding a certificate chain.
(b) Verifying the certificates in the chain.
Although the self-organized methodology for PKI
deployment has been extensively analyzed [21–23], there are
still open questions that needs further research. One of this
pending questions is how to encourage node’s participation
in the tasks related to certification issuance or certification
exchange. Since many resources are limited in MANETs the
cooperation issue is a major issue when dealing with many
node tasks, and PKI management is one of the crucial ones.
In the following we describe how certificate management
and public-key verification are carried out in the self-
organized model.
Each node u generates by itself the pair formed by its
public key and its secret key. Then a request for signing the
generated public key is sent to u’s neighbours. Since these
nodes are in a one-hop distance from u, they can use any
trusted mechanisms such as side channels in order to assure
the binding established between the corresponding public
key and the node’s identity.
Apart from that, in order to ease certificate revocation,
each certificate issued will be valid for a certain period
of time. This parameter may be chosen depending on the
mobility characteristics of the underlying MANET.
Since the certificates issued by a node are stored in its
local repository, one of the tasks that a node may perform
during idle periods is the renewal of certificates issued by
it to those nodes that might still be considered as trusted.
Otherwise, certificate renewal may be developed on demand.
It means that when an expired certificate is included in
the non-updated repository of a node, such a node should
request a renewal for that certificate. When a certificate for a
node u is issued by a node v the edge (v,u) is added to the
certificate graph and each node u and v stores it in its in-
bound and outbound list, respectively.
Note that the speed in the creation of the certificate
graph and its density depend on the willingness of users
for distributing certificates, and on nodes’ mobility. In
particular, the more mobility the nodes have, the more
complete the repositories will be. The same happens with
other aspects related to MANET cooperation.
As in any PKI-based system, certificate revocation should
be also taken into account. When revocation is initiated due
to key compromise or misbehaviour of the corresponding
node, the certificate issuer sends a message to all nodes
stating that such a certificate has been revoked. This can be
accomplished because each node maintains a list containing
the members of the network that have contacted it to request
updates of the certificates it had issued. Hence, in fact it is not
necessary to send the revocation message to all the members
of the network. The last proposals related to revocation
policies in MANETs defend the creation of schemes based
in reputation systems [24, 25]. When revocation is due to
the fact that the expiration time has been reached, such a
revocation can be deduced directly by all nodes since the
expiration date is contained in the certificate. The work in
[26] describes a method to update expired certificates by
using probabilistic multicast. The importance of this method
is that nodes diﬀerent from the actual issuer of the certificate
can update it once it has expired.
Certificate exchange can be considered a low-cost pro-
cedure because it only involves one-hop distance nodes.
It allows to share and to distribute the issued and stored
certificates. A description of this procedure is as follows.
(1) Every node u retransmits the hash values of the
certificates stored in the repositories Gu and GNu
to its neighbours. The recipient nodes answer with
the hash values of the certificates contained in their
repositories.
(2) Every node compares the received value with the one
it already has and requests to its neighbours only the
certificates that are new.
(3) If the local memory of a node is not large enough, the
expired certificates are deleted from the non-updated
repository, starting by the oldest ones.
(4) In this way, after a short period of time the non-
updated repository GNu contains almost all the certifi-
cate graph G. Afterwards, the only task to be carried
out by the nodes is to exchange the new certificates.
In the original proposal two ways of building the updated
certificate repository Gu of a node u were described.
(1) Node u communicates with its neighbours in the
certificate graph.
(2) Node u applies over GNu an appropriate algorithm in
order to generate Gu after checking the validity of
every single certificate.
One of the crucial issues in the self-organized scheme
that may influence the correct behaviour of the whole
scheme is the selection of the certificates stored by each
node in its repository. The method specified with this
objective should satisfy two requirements at the same time:
limitation in storing requirements, and performance of the
updated repository in terms of ability to find chains for the
largest possible number of nodes. This problem, known as
certification chain discovery problem, has received particular
attention in the bibliography related toMANETs [21–23, 27].
Since the algorithm used in the construction of the
updated repositories will influence the eﬃciency of the
scheme, it should be carefully designed. The simplest
algorithm for that construction is the so-called Maximum
Degree Algorithm (MDA) [20] (see Algorithm 1 ), where the
criterion followed in the selection of certificates is mainly the
degree of the vertices in the certificate graph.
There is another more sophisticated algorithm, called
Shortcut Hunter Algorithm, in which certificates are chosen
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input: G, u, lout, c
Output: MDA−Gout
//Initialization
(1) Vout ←∅,Aout ←∅,Dout ←∅
(2) eout = min{degout(u), c}
(3) l ← degout(u)
(4) N1(u) = Sout(N1(u)) = {v1, v2, . . . , vl}
(5) Dout = {v1, v2, . . . , veout}
(6) Vout = Vout ∪ {u} ∪Dout
(7) Aout = Aout ∪ {(u, vi)}, i = 1, 2, . . . , eout
(8) i← 1, li ← 1
(9) while i < eout do
(10) while Dout /=∅ do
(11) if li = lout then
(12) i← i + 1
(13) end
(14) else
(15) vi = get(Dout)
(16) N1(vi) = Sout(N1(vi))
(17) wi = get(N1(vi))
(18) while wi ∈ Dout and N1(vi) /=∅ do
(19) wi = get(N1(vi))
(20) if N1(vi) = ∅ then
(21) i← i + 1
(22) end
(23) else
(24) if wi /∈Dout then
(25) put(wi,Dout)
(26) Aout = Aout ∪ {(vi,wi)}
(27) Vout = Vout ∪ {wi}
(28) li = li + 1










Algorithm 1: MDA – Gout heuristic.
taking into account that when they are deleted, the length
of the minimum path between the nodes connected through
that certificate is increased in more than 2.
When using the MDA, every node u builds two sub-
graphs, the out-bound subgraph and the inbound subgraph,
which when joined generate the updated certificate repos-
itory Gu. The outbound subgraph is formed by several
disjoint paths with the same origin vertex u while in the in-
bound subgraph u is the final vertex. In the description of
the MDA algorithm, the starting node is u and degout(u),
degin(u) stands for the in-degree and the out-degree of
node u, respectively. The number of paths to be found is
represented by c.
A bound on the number of disjoint paths starting at u as
well as a bound on the number of disjoint paths to be built
with u as final node are given by eout and ein, respectively.
Another important input parameter is s, which repre-
sents the maximum number of vertices to be included in
the subgraph generated when the in-bound and the out-
bound subgraphs are combined. This parameter may be also
controlled by defining as lout = 
s/(2eout) the length of the
chains generated when building the out-bound subgraph and
lin = 
s/(2ein) for the in-bound one.
In order to apply the greedy criterion, Sout(N) and
Sin(N), where N consists of a set of vertices, include the
sorted vertices of N into descending order according to
degout(u) and degin(u), respectively.
Note that the process to build the in-bound subgraph is
equivalent to it except for the fact that in this case the edges
to be chosen are always incoming edges.
In the first stage of the MDA, degout(u) outgoing arcs
from u are included. The final vertices of these arcs are then
included in Dout. This set is implemented as a typical queue
where the insertion (put) and the extraction (get)operations
are used. Henceforth, eout arcs are chosen in such a way
that the formed paths are disjoint. This is accomplished by
selecting their origin belonging to Dout and checking that
neither the origin nor the final vertices were previously used
in another path.
4. Proposed Algorithm
The main contribution of this paper consists in substituting
the MDA algorithm proposed for the updated repository
construction by a new algorithm that uses the MPR tech-
nique described in Section 2 (see Algorithm 2). In this way,
for each vertex in the certificate graph we have to define a
re-transmitter set.
The MPR heuristic adapted to the certificate graph
is described below. First, node u starts by calculating
MPR(u) = {v1, v2, . . . , vk}. Then, these vertices are included
in Gout together with the edges (u, vi), i = 1, 2, . . . , k.
Henceforth, nodes vi in MPR(u) apply recursively the same
procedure of retransmitting backwards the result MPR(vi).
In order to extend the notation used in the introduction
of the MPR greedy heuristic described in Section 2, which
is required to be used in the certificate graph, we denote by
Ni(u) the set of predecessors of node u that may be found
in an i-hop distance. This means that the smallest number
of certificate chains required in order to reach the remaining
nodes will be obtained as well. The algorithm proposed is an
iterative scheme that may be described in the following way.
(1) Every vertex u ∈ G locally determines its re-
transmitter set (MPR(u)), which include the certifi-
cates associated to the corresponding edges.
(2) This vertex contacts all the nodes in MPR(u). At
this stage, every node v ∈ MPR(u) has previously
obtained its retransmitters set MPR(u), and con-
sequently it may send to node u the certificates
associated to such a set.
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Since each node knows from whom is a re-transmitter,
the Gin subgraph is generated by applying first the reverse
process and then adding in-going arcs. The certificate chains
required in the authentication are built by using the arcs
(u,MPR(u)). After that, for all v ∈ MPR(u) and for all w ∈
MPR(v) the arcs (v,w) are also added after having checked
that they have not been added in previous updates.
Note that the procedure every node u ∈ G has to develop
in order to build MPR(u) takes 1 + ln(N2(u)) steps when
no bound is defined on the length of the chains to be built.
Otherwise, the number of iterations to be carried out is given
by the number of hops to explore in the certificate graph. As
for the definition of the aforementioned bound, it has to be
remarked that such a parameter may be dynamically adjusted
in function of the changes experienced by the certificate
graph. This may be justified by the fact that as the network
evolves, the information contained in each node’s repository
is more complete. Thanks to this substitution the generated
procedure is easier and more eﬃcient, guaranteeing in this
way that each node has a set of neighbours that allows it to
reach the biggest number of public keys.
One of the main advantages of the proposal is that all
the information gathered for the construction of the chains is
locally obtained by each node. After obtaining the in-bound
and out-bound subgraphs, both subgraphs are merged and
the initial repository is generated so that the authentication
process may start. When a node u needs to check the validity
of the public key of another node v, it has to find a certificate
chain Puv from itself to v in the graph that results from
combining its own repository with v’s repository. If this
chain is not found there, the search is extended to Gu ∪ GNu ,
what implies the inclusion of u’s nonupdated repository in
the search. If this second exploration is successful, u should
request the update of those certificates that belong exclusively
to GNu . When no path is found, the authentication fails. Once
the path Puv is determined, u should validate every certificate
included in it. This is done as follows.
(1) The first certificate in the chain (u,u0) is directly
checked by u since it was signed by u himself.
(2) Each one of the remaining certificates (ui,ui+1) in the
chain may be checked using the public key of the
previous node ui−1.
(3) The last arc (um, v) corresponds to the certificate
issued by um that binds v with its public key.
The proposal described in this work will allow us to
integrate information obtained and used by the routing
process into the PKI management tasks. This approach will
simplify the certification procedures. This idea of combining
routing information within authentication procedures was
also put forward in [21]. One of themain diﬀerences between
our proposal and the scheme described there is the routing
scheme used as base. We make use of the OLSR proactive
scheme (more specifically we use the MPR technique used
there), while the reactive AODV routing protocol is used by
the other proposal. The main idea behind this alternative is
to build a binary tree of trust connecting all the nodes in the




(1) MPR−Gout(u) = ∅
//Stage 0
(2) N1(u) = {v01 , v02 , . . . , v0l }
(3) for i← 1 to l do
(4) N1(v0i )
(5) if N1(v0i ) = ∅ then
(6) MPR−Gout(u) =MPR−Gout(u)∪ {v0i }
(7) end
(8) end
(9) l = l − |MPR−Gout(u)|
(10) N(u) = N(u) \MPR−Gout(u) = {v11 , v12 , . . . , v1l }
//Stage 1
(11) for i← 1 to l do
(12) Wv1i (u) = N1(v1i )∩N2(u) = {w1,w2, . . . ,wk}
(13) if k /= 0 then
(14) for j = 1 to k do
(15) N1(wj)
(16) Vwj (u) = N1(u)∩N1(wj)
(17) if |Vwj (u)| = 1 then
(18) MPR−Gout(u) =MPR−Gout(u)∪ {v1i }





(24) l = l − |MPR−Gout(u)|
(25) N(u) = N(u) \MPR−Gout(u)) = {v21 , v22 , . . . , v2l }
//Stage 2
(26) While N2(u) /=∅ do
(27) for i = 1 to l do
(28) N1(v2i )
(29) Wv2i (u) = N1(v2i )∩N2(u)
(30) du(v2i ) = |Wv2i (u)|
(31) end
(32) dmax(u) = max d+u (v2i ), i = 1, 2, . . . , l
(33) for i = 1 to l do
(34) if d+u (v
2
i ) = dmax(u) then
(35) MPR−Gout(u) =MPR(u)−Gout(u)∪ {v2i }
(36) N2(u) = N2(u) \Wv2i (u)
(37) end
(38) end
(39) N1(u) = N1(u) \MPR−Gout(u)
(40) end
Algorithm 2: MPR−Gout heuristic.
path discovery and certificate issuance. The main diﬃculties
behind the use of such a global structure is that network
partition may occur easily since each node only has direct
trusted connections with its parent and two-child nodes.
Depending on the mobility pattern associate to member
nodes this number of connections may be inadequate.
There is a characteristic in the designed algorithm that is
shared with the proposal described at [22]. It is possible to
adapt the number of certificate chains to be built as well as
their length depending on the characteristics of the MANET
where the proposal must be implemented.
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5. Experimental Results
This work proposes the application of the MPR technique
in the computation of certificate repositories included in the
self-organized public-key management model. Our proposal
is supported by the good results obtained when using the
MPR procedure in the OLSR routing algorithm in MANETs
as well as computational experiments. A detailed description
of the implementation and the results provided by it are
presented in the current section. The main goal of the
experiments was showing that applying the MPR technique
when building certificate repositories in the self-organized
approach instead of using the MDA heuristic provides
the public-key management scheme with simplicity and
eﬃciency.
5.1. Implementation Characteristics. The implementation
has been carried out using Java and the open source library
JUNG 2.0 (Java Universal Network/Graph Framework)
which provides the basic tools for representing and dealing
with graphs.
One of the reasons why JUNG was selected was having
the possibility of working with random graphs with the
small-world property. When a graph follows the small-world
model, it is assumed that its paths have a small average length
and a high Clustering Coeﬃcient (CC). The CC corresponds
with the average of the fraction of pairs of u’s neighbours
(taken over all the network nodes u ∈ |V |) which are at the
same time direct neighbours of each other.
This characteristic is supported by certificate graphs as it
was shown in [28]. When a graph holds this feature, most
nodes may be reached by a small number of hops from
any source node. This kind of graphs has received special
attention in several scientific disciplines [29]. In [30], an
extended small-world model with applications in diﬀerent
MANET scenarios was introduced.
The small-world model used in the simulation developed
was proposed by Kleingberg [31]. When generating a graph
with |V | = n2 vertices according to this model, the first
step is to create an n × n toroidal lattice. Then each node
u is connected to four local neighbours, and in addition one
long range connection to some node v, where v is chosen
randomly, according to a probability proportional to d−α. d
denotes the lattice distance between u and v and α stands
for the CC. Generating the graphs following this model
guarantees that the shortest paths may be determined using
local information, what makes them particularly interesting
for the networks we are dealing with.
5.2. Computational Results. Some of the data gathered from
the first computational experience are shown below (see
Table 1). The number of nodes in the graph (n), the rate of
certificates contained in the repository (Rc), the clustering
coeﬃcient (α), the maximum length in the chains generated
(Cl), and the time consumption while the execution (t)
expressed in seconds are the parameters that have been
measured. From this experience, it may be remarked that



















Figure 3: Time consumption.
increases as the size of the graph increases as well as the
clustering coeﬃcient increases. This phenomenon may be
better appreciated in Figure 3. Additionally, the maximum
lengths in the obtained chains are kept at reasonable values,
that is what makes the chain verification process lighter.
Finally, the rate of certificates stored in the repository
surpasses 95% in more than 75% of the executions while
time consumption corresponds to sensible values. These first
experiments showed promising results.
Another computational experience consisted of gener-
ating random graphs according to the Kleingberg’s model
where the size of the graphs |V | ranges in the inter-
val [9, 441], the Clustering Coeﬃcient (CC) takes values
between [0, 30]. For these parameters, the Certificate Rate
obtained by MPR (CRMPR) jointly with time consumption
(tMPR) expressed in seconds were measured.
For analyzing the MDA alternative, it is applied over
the same input graphs using as specific parameters the
maximum number of chains to built (nchains) and their
maximum length (Cl) is bounded by 7. In this case,
the Certificate Rate in the repository (CRMDA) and time
consumption (tMDA) were also obtained.
From this experience, there are some general conclusions
that may be remarked. The certificate rate CRMPR finally
contained in the local repository increases as the size of the
graph increases. However, the behaviour of the certificate
rate is not aﬀected by the growth of the Clustering Coeﬃ-
cient. This phenomenamay be better appreciated in Figure 4.
Additionally, the maximum length in the chains obtained by
MPR are kept at reasonable values, what makes the chain
verification process lighter.
The most important fact when comparing the certificate
rates CRMDA and CRMPR is that only in the 3.95% of
the executions the MDA algorithm outperforms MPR, and
it only occurs when the input certificate graph is small.
Although, in the previous figure it seems that the diﬀerence
between both certificates rates is reduced as the size of the
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Table 1: Computational Experience.
α = 0.1 α = 0.4 α = 0.8
n Rc Cl t Rc Cl t Rc Cl t
9 42.93 4 0.24 37.03 3 0.27 37.78 3 0.18
16 82.08 3 0.49 86.67 3 0.41 84.17 3 0.46
25 93.13 3 0.64 96.00 3 0.59 96.00 3 0.69
36 98.70 3 0.81 99.63 3 0.83 99.44 3 0.8
49 99.73 4 1.24 99.18 4 1.2 99.59 4 0.92
64 99.59 3 0.68 100.00 4 0.68 99.48 3 0.64
81 99.92 4 0.77 99.92 4 0.81 99.82 4 0.84
100 99.93 4 0.91 99.93 4 0.97 99.80 4 0.96




















Figure 4: Comparing certificate rates.
graph increases, it should be taken in mind that MANETs
have a limited number of nodes. Furthermore, in the 45.83%
percent of the problems the diﬀerence between the certificate
rates CRMPR and CRMDA is in the interval [50%, 75%] (see
Figure 5).
Hence, it may be concluded that the repository built
by MPR provides further information to facilitate the
authentication process. Finally, another result that illustrates
the positive characteristics of MPR to solve the problem of
updating the certificate repository is that in the 82.45% of the
executions the repository built by MPR contains more than









0 ≤ CRD < 25
25 ≤ CRD < 50
50 < CRD ≤ 75
75 < CRD ≤ 90
CRD ≥ 90
Figure 5: Certificate rate diﬀerence.
6. Conclusion
The application of the Multipoint Relay Technique in the
update process of public key certificate repositories in
MANETs has been evaluated in this work. For the assessment
of this proposal, several experiments with an implementation
developed in JAVA have been carried out. According to
these experiments the presented alternative outperforms the
original graph-based and self-organized model in several
aspects. The most relevant improvements of the proposed
MPR-based method are a higher certificate rate included in
the repository and the shorter generated certificate chains.
They result in a less need of interaction among nodes during
the building process of an authentication chain and lead to a
more eﬃcient verification procedure.
Our immediate goal is to adapt the developed imple-
mentation to a network simulator in order to evaluate the
behaviour of the method with diﬀerent mobility models.
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